Industrial Restructuring and Economic Growth by Carree, M.A.
  
 
Industrial Restructuring and Economic Growth
Citation for published version (APA):
Carree, M. A. (2002). Industrial Restructuring and Economic Growth. Small Business Economics, 18, 243-
255. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015227217356
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2002
DOI:
10.1023/A:1015227217356
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 Industrial Restructuring
and Economic Growth M. A. Carree
Small Business Economics 18: 243–255, 2002.
 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers.  Printed in the Netherlands.
ABSTRACT.  The last two decades have been a period of
structural change in industrialised countries. The extent of this
restructuring process has been different across countries and
industries, though. In this paper we investigate the effect of
lagging behind in the process of downsizing and deconcen-
tration. We find empirical evidence of industries that
experienced only little downsizing when compared interna-
tionally to experience less subsequent growth, on average.
However, this effect is industry-dependent and its magnitude
depends upon whether firm or establishment data are used.
Technologically advanced industries are found to be particu-
larly sensitive to (lack of) restructuring.
1.  Introduction
In the industrialised countries there has been a
tendency for the share of large units in manufac-
turing to decrease in terms of economic activity.
Carlsson (1996), for example, shows that the
employment share of the Fortune 500 firms in U.S.
manufacturing has decreased from almost 80% in
1975 to 65% in 1990. The reasons for the decline
in the share of largeness in manufacturing have
been discussed in a series of papers. However, the
consequences of this decline have been barely
addressed in the literature. This is somewhat
surprising as the speed of this industrial restruc-
turing process has been different across countries.
In the current paper we investigate how the extent
of the shift of economic activity from large to
small businesses has affected economic perfor-
mance. For this purpose we use a data set of 26
manufacturing industries at the 3-digit level for
the five largest economies, France, Germany,
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States. 
There is substantial evidence that economic
activity in manufacturing has been moving away
from large firms to small firms in the final quarter
of the 20th century. Papers which provide statis-
tical evidence for several countries include Acs
and Audretsch (1993), Van Ark and Monnikhof
(1996), Carlsson (1996), Loveman and
Sengenberger (1991) and OECD (1994). One
explanation for the growing small business
presence economy-wide is the increase of the
employment share of the relatively small-scaled
service sector at the expense of the relatively
large-scaled manufacturing sector. But also in the
manufacturing sector itself small entrepreneurial
firms have achieved considerable economic suc-
cesses in a period during which many well-known
large corporations suffered heavy losses. Various
authors have contributed to our understanding of
the reasons behind this change in the size class
structure of industries. Loveman and Sengenberger
(1991) mention two important trends of industrial
restructuring: that of decentralisation and vertical
disintegration of large companies (returning to
core activities) and that of the formation of new
business communities. In addition, they argue that
there has been an increasing role of public and
private policies promoting the small business
sector (e.g. venture capital). Piore and Sabel
(1984) consider industrialised countries to be in
what they call the Second Industrial Divide and
claim that it has promoted flexible specialisation
making economies of scale less important than
beforehand.1 Flexible specialisation is thought to
be beneficial for small firms because they are
better equipped to deal with market fragmentation.
A collection of other reasons can be found in
Brock and Evans (1989). These include the
increased demand for variety leading to niche
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markets and the deregulation movement which
sweeps the world.
The list of reasons for the process of down-
scaling in manufacturing industries suggests that
the extent of the shift of economic activity from
large to small businesses may affect economic
performance.2 Acs (1992, 1996) claims that small
firms fulfil an important role in the economy
serving as entrepreneurial agents of change, being
the source of an important part of innovative
activity, stimulating industrial evolution, and
creating an important share of the newly generated
jobs.3 The transfer of employment from large to
smaller firms has intensified scepticism about
superior economic performance of large enter-
prises and led to “a revival of the ideology of
entrepreneurial capitalism” (Lane, 1995, p. 64).
The large, vertically integrated and centralised
corporations have become associated with un-
desirable features like excessive bureaucratic
control, rigidity, failure of communication and
lack of concentration on core activities. The dis-
integration and deconcentration of such companies
in the 1980s implied an increase in the small firm
employment share through subcontracting, divest-
ments and buy-outs.4 The resurgence of small
firms does not imply that the large-firm sector fails
to contribute to economic development. Large
companies and small and medium-sized firms
have complementary strenghts, see for example
the theory of “dynamic complementarity” in the
advance of technology (Rothwell, 1983, 1984). In
addition, in several industries scale economies in
production (e.g. petroleum refineries) or research
and development (e.g. pharmaceuticals) leave the
“minimum efficient scale” relatively large. The
idea is summarised by Lane (1995) as “a balanced
size distribution, including also medium-sized
enterprises, together with co-operation between
large and small firms, is widely seen as a
favourable condition of strong economic perfor-
mance” (p. 119).
In the current analysis we concentrate on the
effects of changes in the size distribution of firms
and plants. This is only one dimension of struc-
tural change. Important other trends of restruc-
turing like economic activity shifting away from
low-skill industries to technologically advanced
industries, the increased importance of multi-
nationals, trends in the specialisation of countries
or the geographic concentration of industries (see
e.g. Aiginger et al., 1999) and changes in the
extent of diversification (see e.g. Jovanovic, 1993)
are not taken into account. However, these other
trends are more or less related to changes in the
firm-size distribution. For example, the trend
towards shifting activity away from manufacturing
towards service industries is partly a consequence
of manufacturing firms returning to core activities
and reducing their workforce involved in service-
related activities. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In
Section 2 we discuss the empirical evidence on the
extent of downsizing in manufacturing industries.
We also discuss our data set and discuss the
variables of restructuring (downsizing) and
economic growth. Restructuring is measured as
the change in the share of large firms, while
economic growth is measured in terms of the
growth in value added in constant prices. In
Section 3 we present the empirical results of the
effect of the extent of restructuring on (subse-
quent) economic growth. Section 4 concludes.
2.  The decreasing share of large firms and 
2. large plants
A comparison of the extent of downsizing in terms
of the declining share of employment share of
large firms across countries shows some striking
differences.5 Lane (1995, p. 73) reports for
example that this employment loss has been very
pronounced in the United Kingdom, while it has
been more moderate in France and only very slight
in Germany, during the 1981–1987 period. She
shows that similar reductions had been taking
place at the enterprise and at the establishment
level. Data provided by van Ark and Monnikhof
(1996) for the share of enterprises with 500 and
more employees as a percentage of total employ-
ment in manufacturing confirm this. They show
that in the United Kingdom the share dropped
from 54.3% to 40.9% in the 1977–1990 period.6
This decline was from 55.3% to 44.7% for France
and from 58.0% to 56.6% for Germany, respec-
tively in the same period.7 These data indicate that
in terms of the share of large firms in employment
the German manufacturing sector has failed to
restructure during the 1977–1990 period.8
The rigorous industrial restructuring may have
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given the manufacturing sector in the United
Kingdom, on average, a better starting position for
the 1990s than its German counterpart. However,
there is very little empirical research which
supports such a type of assertion. We mention
three exceptions. Engelbrecht (1997) found that
the organisational “fat” built up in U.S. manufac-
turing firms in previous years adversely affected
U.S. export competitiveness to an important extent
during the 1980s. The increased openness to
international trade forced U.S. manufacturing
firms to cut nonproduction employment. Nickell
(1996) and Nickell et al. (1997) presented
evidence that competition, as measured by
increased number of competitors, has a positive
effect on the rate of total factor productivity
growth. Carree and Thurik (1998) showed
evidence for European manufacturing at the two-
digit industry level that a relatively high large firm
share in 1990 has had a negative impact on
production growth in the 1990–1994 period. This
study extends the evidence provided in the study
by Carree and Thurik by examining industries at
a lower level of aggregation, by investigating
industry-specific effects and by including the
Japanese and U.S. manufacturing sectors.9
In this study we use a data set of five countries,
being the largest economies, France, Germany,
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States,
and 26 manufacturing industries. As a measure of
restructuring we use the change of the employment
share of “units” with 500 and more employees
during the 1977–1990 period.10 For France,
Germany and the United Kingdom the “units” are
enterprises while for Japan and the United States
these are establishments (plants). The source of
the employment share data is van Ark and
Monnikhof (1996). As a measure of economic
performance we use the growth of value added (in
constant prices) over the 1990–1994 period. The
source of these data is the OECD STAN Database
(1997). In Table I the industries and their corre-
sponding average value added index (VAI) in
constant prices (VAI = Value added 1994/Value
added 1990) are displayed. Furthermore, it shows
the corresponding averages and standard devia-
tions of the large firm employment share (LFES)
for France, Germany and the United Kingdom for
1990. In the appendix the same data are shown for
197711 and for the average and standard deviation
of the large plant employment share for Japan and
the United States, both in 1977 and 1990.
Table I shows that the electrical machinery
industry (ISIC 383) had the strongest increase of
value added on average for the five countries. The
average rise in value added was 17.9%. The
largest decline on average was found for the
footwear industry (ISIC 324). The average decline
was 24.5%. These figures are an indication of the
shift from low-tech to high-tech industries which
is taking place in developed countries.12
In the second column of Table I we see that the
industries with smallest scale of production are the
“low-tech” industries of wearing apparel (ISIC
322), leather products (ISIC 323), wood products
(ISIC 331), furniture and fixtures (ISIC 332) and
printing and publishing (ISIC 342). In the last
column of Table I the standard deviation of the
employment share of firms with 500 or more
employees is presented. The industry structure
appears to be very different between the three
European economies in the industries of food
products (ISIC 311/2), beverages (ISIC 313),
rubber products (ISIC 355) and machinery, nec
(incl. computers) (ISIC 382). Out of 26 industries
there are 22 in which the standard deviation
increased between 1977 and 1990. The main
reason for this is the lack of restructuring in
Germany. In 1977 the average LFES in France,
Germany and the United Kingdom were 0.493,
0.512 and 0.511. In 1990 these values were
changed to 0.415, 0.492 and 0.416. That is,
whereas in 1977 the share of large firms, on
average, in manufacturing industries was about
equal in the three countries, in 1990 Germany had
a clearly larger share than France and the United
Kingdom.13
Comparing industry structure across countries
poses several problems. One such problem is that
the unit of analysis is defined differently across
countries. The unit of analysis is the “enterprise”
in case of the European countries. The “enterprise”
is a legal entity representing common ownership
or control as recognised in national legislation.14
In case of Japan and the United States the unit of
analysis is the “establishment”, which is charac-
terised by its single physical location where
industrial production or services are executed.
Because of this difference in the unit of analysis
we concentrate on comparing the three European
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countries and comparing Japan with the United
States.15 There are differences not only with
respect to the unit of analysis, but also the extent
of dependency of small firms on large firms may
differ. The Japanese industrial subcontracting
system, for example, has strong ties between firms
within an industrial group, the keiretsu (McMillan,
1996). For these reasons we should be cautious
when comparing the structural developments
across countries.16
Our measure of the rate of restructuring is the
change in the employment share of units with 500
or more employees in the period 1977–1990. For
the three European countries the unit is the firm.
For Japan and the United States the unit is the
establishment. In Table II we show the average
and the standard deviation of the change of the
employment share of large units. The averages
show that the U.K. manufacturing sector and the
German counterpart were polar cases. In the
United Kingdom the drop in the share of large
firms was relatively strong, while in Germany it
was only limited. The standard deviation of the
change across the 26 industries ranges from 0.055
for France to 0.081 for the United Kingdom.
Neither in the case of the average growth of the
large unit employment share nor the standard
deviation of this variable, we find that the three
countries with “enterprise” data form a group that
differs strongly from the group of two countries
with “establishment” data. 
In Table III the correlation matrices of both the
change in large unit presence and the growth rate
of value added is presented. We find that value
added growth is positively correlated across coun-
tries. That is, industries that grow more than on
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TABLE I
Growth and restructuring in 26 manufacturing industries
ISIC Industry Average VAI Av. LFES Std. LFES
311/2 Food products 1.001 0.396 0.152
313 Beverages 1.010 0.435 0.174
321 Textiles 0.934 0.302 0.089
322 Wearing apparel 0.849 0.204 0.120
323 Leather products 0.777 0.076 0.045
324 Footwear 0.755 0.398 0.089
331 Wood products 0.979 0.093 0.039
332 Furniture and fixtures 0.963 0.160 0.099
341 Paper products and pulp 0.994 0.315 0.058
342 Printing and publishing 0.968 0.185 0.061
351 Industrial chemicals 1.050 0.670 0.126
352 Other chemicals (including drugs) 1.120 0.660 0.114
353 Petroleum refineries 1.070 0.819 0.031
355 Rubber products 0.929 0.706 0.158
356 Plastic products, nec 1.098 0.230 0.093
361 Pottery, china, etc 0.936 0.568 0.114
362 Glass products 1.001 0.617 0.043
369 Non-metal products, nec 0.999 0.282 0.091
371 Iron and steel 0.974 0.699 0.104
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.932 0.426 0.112
381 Metal products 0.977 0.207 0.107
382 Machinery nec (including computers) 0.921 0.355 0.153
383 Electrical machinery 1.179 0.626 0.106
3843 Motor vehicles 1.000 0.818 0.112
3845 Aircraft 0.850 0.896 0.036
385 Professional goods 0.897 0.324 0.091
Note: VAI stands for “value added index” and equals the ratio of the industry value added in 1994 and that in 1990, both in local
currencies and constant prices. LFES stands for the “large firm employment share”, which is the employment share of enterprises
for France, Germany and the United Kingdom with 500 or more employees. The last two columns of the table contain the average
and standard deviation of LFES for 1990.
average in one country are also likely to grow
more than on average in another country. A high
correlation coefficient between the value added
growth indices for two countries indicates that
structural developments, in the sense of shifts in
the industry shares in the manufacturing sector,
have been similar for the 1990–94 period. With
two exceptions (France-Germany and Germany-
Japan) the correlations between the changes in the
employment share of large units are positive as
well. The average correlation is relatively low at
0.21. It shows that there are large differences
between countries in the distribution of the extent
of restructuring across industries. In case an
industry in one country shows an above average
decrease in large unit presence, it is not unlikely
for it to show a less than average decrease in
another country. 
3.  Regression results
In this section we present the model and discuss
the estimation results of the effect of the rate of
downsizing at the industry level on (subsequent)
economic growth. The effect of restructuring is
likely to be industry-dependent with some indus-
tries experiencing increased importance of
economies of scale and others experiencing
increased importance of diseconomies of scale. We
will pay special attention to the four technologi-
cally advanced industries out of 26 industries. The
four high R&D-intensity industries in our sample
are other chemicals (incl. drugs) (ISIC 352),
machinery nec (incl. computers) (ISIC 382), elec-
trical machinery (ISIC 383) and the aircraft
industry (ISIC 3845).17 These industries are
assigned to have a dummy value Dr&d equal to one,
while it is zero for the other 22 industries.
We will use a linear regression model to inves-
tigate the effect of restructuring and the extent to
which this effect is industry-dependent. Previous
research that has focused on the relation between
scale of production (viz. small firm presence) and
economic performance have either chosen to focus
on the relation between economic growth and the
level of small business presence (Carree and
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TABLE II
Summary statistics of restructuring and growth
DLES VAI
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
France –0.079 0.055 0.964 0.092
Germany –0.020 0.068 0.928 0.149
Japan –0.059 0.070 0.934 0.170
United Kingdom –0.094 0.081 0.961 0.103
United States –0.053 0.062 1.052 0.164
Total –0.061 0.071 0.968 0.144
Note: DLES stands for the change in the “large unit employment share”. VAI stands for the “value added index” with 1990 = 1.
In the last row all 130 observations are taken into account.
TABLE III
Correlations of value added index (VAI) and change in large unit presence (DLES)
France Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
France –0.55 0.42 0.12 0.34
Germany –0.04 0.53 0.34 0.51
Japan –0.19 –0.02 0.45 0.35
United Kingdom –0.34 –0.26 0.36 0.13
United States –0.14 –0.44 0.24 0.16
Note: The correlation coefficients below the diagonal are for the change in the “large unit employment share” (DLES) while
those above the diagonal are for the “value added index” (VAI).
Thurik, 1998; Robbins et al., 2000) or to focus on
the relation between the change in the economic
growth rate and the change in the level of small
business presence (Audretsch et al., 2000). Our
Equation (1) has the same independent variable as
in this second approach.
VAIijt – VAIit = 
 
αj + βi(DLESij, t – 1 – DLESi, t – 1) 
+ δ(VAIij, t – 1 – VAIi, t – 1) + εij (1) 
In this equation the indices i and j stand for
industry and country, respectively. The value
added index (1990–1994), its lagged value
(1986–1990) and the change in the large unit
presence (1977–1990) are both taken in deviation
from the industry mean across the three countries
(for France, Germany and United Kingdom) and
the two countries (for Japan and the United States)
to remove industry-specific effects. This implies
that the estimates for the parameters can be
interpreted as fixed-effects estimates. We consider
a constant country-specific effect (αj) and an
industry-specific effect of the relative restructuring
rate (βi). The constant country-specific effect is
incorporated into the model to correct for
economy-wide developments like changes in for
example interest, tax and exchange rates. We
distinguish between a general restructuring effect
(β), a scale of production effect (γsca), a hetero-
geneity effect (γhet) and an effect for industries
with high R&D-intensity (γr&d):
βi = β + γscaµi + γhetσi + γr&dDr&d. (2)
The scale of production of industries is measured
by the average µi of the large firm employment
share for the countries in 1977. The extent to
which industries are heterogeneous in terms of
industrial structure is measured by the standard
deviation σi of the large firm employment share
across the countries in 1977. See the appendix for
the value of these variables for the industries for
the three European countries case and the case of
Japan and the United States. In case the effect of
the lagged dependent variable (δ) is equal to one,
Equation (1) corresponds to the model used in
Audretsch et al. (2000) in which the change in the
economic growth rate is related to the (previous)
change in small firm presence.
The general hypothesis is that industries that
have employment shifting away from large firms
in the period 1977–1990 have benefited in terms
of economic growth in the early 1990s. However,
the size of the effect is hypothesized to be
industry-dependent. For example, in low-tech
small-scale industries a shift away from large units
may be counter-productive instead of beneficial to
economic performance. We have three hypotheses
concerning the industry-dependence of the effect:
H1: γsca < 0
H2: γhet > 0
H3: γr&d ≠ 0
The first hypothesis is that industries with a
relatively small scale of production do not benefit
from a shift towards small units to the extent that
industries with a large scale of production do.18
The second hypothesis is that industries which
have a large spread in the scale of production
across countries benefit less from a change
towards smaller units when compared with indus-
tries which have a very similar size class distrib-
ution across countries. The existence of strong
differences in the size class distribution across
countries indicates that the economic conse-
quences of shifting structure in the particular
industry may be relatively small. In addition to the
two hypotheses we determine whether high-tech
industries (with a high R&D-output ratio) differ
from the other industries in benefiting from a shift
towards (new and) small firms or in benefiting
from remaining “large scaled”. 
The estimation results for Equation (1) for the
three European countries with firm size data and
for Japan and the United States with establishment
size data can be found in Table IV. In the first and
fourth column we show the results when
neglecting industry-specific effects. The results
show that only Japan and the United States have
a significant country-specific constant. It implies
that irrespective of the changes in industry struc-
ture Japanese industries have shown low growth
while U.S. industries have shown high growth.
Both for the firm data and establishment data we
find a negative effect of DLES, but it is signifi-
cantly different from zero only for the latter case.
It indicates that, on average, a shift towards small
units has led to increased growth.19 The next
columns of the table show that the extent of such
an effect depends upon characteristics of the
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industry under investigation. In Table V we show
estimation results when four small industries (in
terms of employment), viz. leather products (ISIC
323), footwear (ISIC 324), pottery, china, etc.
(ISIC 361) and glass products (ISIC 362), are left
out to consider their impact on the estimation
results. The results barely alter as a consequence
of removing these small industries. We concen-
trate on Table IV when discussing the estimation
results.
We find evidence for small scale industries to
have benefited less from a shift towards smaller
units (γˆsca < 0). In addition we find R&D-intensive
industries to benefit more from such a shift
( γˆr&d < 0). However, the former effect is signifi-
cant only in case of the firm data while the latter
effect is significant only for the establishment
data. Because R&D-intensive industries are among
the ones having the largest scale of production it
is possible that the two effects are (partially)
overlapping. The results presented in the third and
sixth column of the table show that this is barely
the case, though the effect for R&D-intensive
industries becomes significant at the 10% level for
firm data when removing the scale effect. The data
for the three European countries strongly suggest
that high-tech industries may have benefited from
a shift towards small units. That is, Germany
experienced for each of the four high-tech indus-
tries the lowest value of VAI and the highest value
of DLES for the three European countries.20
Industries in which the size class distribution
differed strongly across countries in 1977 are
found to have benefited less from a shift towards
small units ( γˆhet > 0). This appears in line with
Simon’s (1991) review on organizations and
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TABLE VI 
The effect of changes in firm and plant size distribution on value added growth (VAI)
Countries France, Germany and U.K. Japan and U.S.
Units Firms Firms Firms Plants Plants Plants
αfra 0.009 0.006 0.004
(0.6) (0.4) (0.2)
αger –0.012 –0.006 –0.007
(0.7) (0.3) (0.4)
αuk 0.004 –0.001 0.003
(0.2) (0.0) (0.2)
αjap –0.048* –0.062* –0.061*
(2.7) (3.8) (3.7)
αus 0.048* 0.062* 0.061*
(2.7) (3.8) (3.7)
β –0.260 –0.149 –0.727* –1.068* –0.738 –1.824*
(1.5) (0.3) (2.3) (3.7) (0.8) (4.2)
γsca –1.405* –1.772
(1.8) (1.3)
γhet 9.877* 8.403* 10.527* 13.805*
(2.4) (2.0) (2.0) (3.1)
γr&d –0.623 –0.736* –1.842* –1.831*
(1.5) (1.7) (2.5) (2.5)
δ –0.027 –0.015 –0.021 –0.230* –0.272* –0.317*
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (1.9) (2.3) (2.8)
R2 0.071 0.176 0.138 0.486 0.633 0.619
N 78 78 78 52 52 52
Note: Absolute t-values between brackets. A star (*) means significant at the 10%-significance level. N is the number of obser-
vations.
markets: “organization size and degree of inte-
gration, and the boundaries between organizations
and markets, are determined by rather subtle
forces. The wide range of organizational arrange-
ments observable in the world suggests that the
equilibrium between the two alternatives may
often be almost neutral” (pp. 41–42). Indeed,
when an industry used to have a wide range of
organizational arrangements (size class structures)
in the first “technological regime”, differences in
the rate of restructuring will tend not to matter that
much. However, when this range was far more
limited it is likely that important differences in the
rate of restructuring affect economic progress in
the subsequent “technological regime”.
The effect of the shift in the size distribution
is stronger for R&D-intensive industries (γˆr&d < 0).
It suggests that an increase in the presence of
small (innovative) firms has had an important
impact on economic growth in the early 1990s. We
provide two examples of industries to consider
the total impact of the change in the size class
distribution. For the R&D-intensive electrical
machinery (ISIC 383) we find the total effect to
be –1.498 for firm data (µ = 0.756 and σ = 0.034)
and –1.927 for establishment data (µ = 0.499 and
σ = 0.146). That is, a restructuring away from
large units appears to have affected economic
growth positively. For furniture and fixtures (ISIC
332) the total effect is 0.322 for firm data (µ =
0.185 and σ = 0.074) and 0.742 for establishment
data (µ = 0.139 and σ = 0.164). In this case a shift
away from large units has had no positive effects.
This industry is a slow-growth small-scale
industries. It may even be considered as
favourable for a highly developed country in case
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TABLE V 
The effect of changes in firm and plant size distribution, small industries removed
Countries France, Germany and U.K. Japan and U.S.
Parameters Firms Firms Firms Plants Plants Plants
αfra 0.003 0.002 –0.002
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1)
αger 0.000 0.007 0.007
(0.0) (0.4) (0.4)
αuk –0.003 –0.009 –0.005
(0.2) (0.5) (0.3)
αjap –0.055* –0.062* –0.061*
(2.9) (3.5) (3.5)
αus 0.055* 0.062* 0.061*
(2.9) (3.5) (3.5)
β –0.246 –0.086 –0.605* –1.469* –0.534 –1.918*
(1.4) (0.2) (2.0) (4.6) (0.4) (4.2)
γsca –1.242 –2.089
(1.7) (1.2)
γhet 8.092* 7.304* 6.518 10.913*
(2.0) (1.8) (1.1) (2.2)
γr&d –0.699* –0.838* –1.629* –1.555*
(1.7) (2.1) (2.1) (2.0)
δ 0.038 0.050 0.047 –0.213* –0.244* –0.285*
(0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (1.8) (2.0) (2.5)
R2 0.048 0.172 0.133 0.559 0.656 0.643
N 66 66 66 44 44 44
Note: Absolute t-values between brackets. A star (*) means significant at the 10%-significance level. N is the number of obser-
vations. Four “small” industries (ISIC 323, 324, 361 and 362) have been removed from the sample.
it gets a smaller share of the world market in such
industries. It indicates structural adjustment from
low-tech towards high-tech industries.
German manufacturing experienced a relatively
slow and limited restructuring process when con-
sidering the limited change in the share of large
firms in employment. This lack of restructuring
may not have affected economic growth in small
scale low-tech industries adversely, but it appears
to have had a negative effect on growth in more
large scale and high-tech industries.21 Lehrer
(2000) reports that German technology-based
entrepreneurship picked up only in the late 1990s.
The Neuer Markt for high-tech issues was impor-
tant in this respect. Economic growth in the
Japanese manufacturing sector was also below
average during the early 1990s but the results
indicate that this is not caused by lack of down-
sizing. Probably, this is a consequence of the
average size of Japanese plants to have already
been relatively low in the 1970s (Van Ark and
Pilat, 1993, p. 35). Table II shows that the restruc-
turing rate in Japan is about equal to the average.
Therefore the lack of growth is mainly explained
by the constant country-specific effect (economy-
wide stagnation). However, Japanese industries, in
which the rate of restructuring was particularly
low compared to their American counterparts,
appear to have suffered an additionally negative
effect next to the economy-wide recession in Japan
in the early 1990s. 
4.  Conclusion
One important dimension of structural change in
industrialised countries has been the shift in
economic actvitiy away from large units towards
smaller counterparts (downsizing). This restruc-
turing process has been taking place in the
majority of manufacturing industries. However,
the speed of this process has been different across
countries and industries. In this paper we seek to
estimate the effect of lagging behind in the
downsizing dimension of the restructuring process.
The statistical results provide empirical evidence
for industrial restructuring to have affected value
added growth. The results are especially strong for
R&D-intensive industries and for industries which
have not been very heterogeneous in terms of their
industry structures. 
We find evidence that industries that failed to
restructure performed less well when compared
internationally. Because (West) Germany has been
restructuring relatively slow in the period before,
this may provide one reason for the low pace of
economic growth in Germany in the early 1990s
next to the problems created by the reunification.
However, the result does not explain the relatively
low economic growth in the Japanese manufac-
turing sector as a whole when compared to U.S.
manufacturing. The reason being that the extent of
restructuring in these two countries in terms of
the change of the large “establishment” share in
employment was, on average, about equal. Both
in the cases of Germany and Japan the results have
to be interpreted with care as the economic per-
formance of the two countries has been relatively
weak in the period of the early 1990s due to
problems of economy-wide structural adjustment.
The current paper concentrates upon one
dimension of industrial restructuring, viz. down-
sizing. A further limitation to the current study is
that only one measure of downsizing is consid-
ered. Our measure of the restructuring rate leaves
some important questions open. A decrease in the
large unit employment share may be the conse-
quence of various factors like spin-offs (MBOs),
closing down production plants, introduction of
labour-saving technologies, new entrants or
reforming the managerial hierarchies. Further
research may provide more insight into the impor-
tance of these various factors in achieving
economic growth. 
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Appendix
TABLE A.1
Summary statistics for the share of firms or plants with 500 or more employees
ISIC France, Germany and U.K. (firms) Japan and U.S. (plants)
Share in 1977 Share in 1990 Share in 1977 Share in 1990
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
311/2 0.427 0.145 0.396 0.152 0.161 0.137 0.187 0.176
313 0.494 0.155 0.435 0.174 0.184 0.180 0.137 0.109
321 0.424 0.005 0.302 0.089 0.280 0.234 0.219 0.259
322 0.224 0.044 0.204 0.120 0.082 0.097 0.080 0.107
323 0.087 0.044 0.076 0.045 0.082 0.105 0.047 0.065
324 0.435 0.032 0.398 0.089 0.170 0.037 0.099 0.113
331 0.125 0.024 0.093 0.039 0.055 0.039 0.033 0.038
332 0.185 0.074 0.160 0.099 0.139 0.164 0.124 0.141
341 0.387 0.038 0.315 0.058 0.254 0.122 0.216 0.141
342 0.257 0.084 0.185 0.061 0.212 0.092 0.181 0.094
351 0.767 0.075 0.670 0.126 0.627 0.025 0.480 0.073
352 0.638 0.117 0.660 0.114 0.323 0.016 0.314 0.081
353 0.838 0.048 0.819 0.031 0.673 0.013 0.506 0.163
355 0.775 0.074 0.706 0.158 0.495 0.182 0.347 0.112
356 0.249 0.040 0.230 0.093 0.072 0.102 0.083 0.045
361 0.632 0.053 0.568 0.114 0.270 0.149 0.211 0.100
362 0.683 0.103 0.617 0.043 0.495 0.170 0.382 0.096
369 0.317 0.011 0.282 0.091 0.081 0.037 0.050 0.041
371 0.808 0.084 0.699 0.104 0.644 0.121 0.521 0.100
372 0.611 0.071 0.426 0.112 0.418 0.046 0.307 0.009
381 0.301 0.059 0.207 0.107 0.156 0.138 0.115 0.083
382 0.473 0.121 0.355 0.153 0.362 0.134 0.286 0.101
383 0.756 0.034 0.626 0.106 0.499 0.146 0.427 0.086
3843 0.888 0.043 0.818 0.112 0.669 0.143 0.624 0.102
3845 0.925 0.027 0.896 0.036 0.876 0.006 0.820 0.053
385 0.433 0.068 0.324 0.091 0.418 0.180 0.442 0.226
France 0.493 0.415
Germany 0.512 0.492
UK 0.511 0.416
Japan 0.264 0.205
US 0.405 0.352
Note: The first two columns and the fifth and sixth column represent the values of µ and σ for the industries as used in Equation
(2). Figures in italic mean that the average share of large units has increased over the 1977–1990 period. The bottom part of the
table shows the averages across industries for the five countries. For Japanese industries the period is in fact 1975–1990 and for
U.S. industries the period is in fact 1977–1987. Calculations based upon data presented in van Ark and Monnikhof (1996).
Notes
1 Jensen (1993) uses the term Third Industrial Revolution and
argues that technological advances are “encouraging smaller,
more efficient, entrepreneurial organising units that co-operate
through technology” (p. 842).
2 Schmitz (1989) and Peretto (1999) present endogenous
growth models in which the number of firms play an impor-
tant role. The model developed by Schmitz implies that the
equilibrium fraction of entrepreneurs is below the social
optimal level. This suggests that welfare gains may be
achieved by promoting the small business sector. Peretto’s
model predicts a hump-shaped relation between the number
of firms and the returns to investment and R&D. In his model
a large number of firms has the advantage of increased
“specialisation” but the disadvantage of enlarged “fragmen-
tation”.
3 The first to discuss the role of small firms in the job
generation process is Birch (1981). It should be taken into
account that small firms also usually have a relatively high
job destruction rate. Acs et al. (1997) provide a discussion of
the importance of small and medium-sized firms in the inno-
vation and diffusion process. However, see Tether (2000) who
argues that the role of new and small firms as job generators
and innovators should not be taken out of proportion.
4 Jovanovic (1993) claims that advances in information
technology have made market-based co-ordination less
expensive relative to internal co-ordination, partially causing
the decline in diversification and firm size. Although corpo-
rate restructuring (downsizing) has been advocated as an
instrument to achieve operating performance improvement of
large firms, its effects on productivity are under debate (Bailey
et al., 1996).
5 Taplin and Winterton (1995) provide a nice illustration for
the clothing industry. 
6 Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) present evidence for the
share of establishments with 500 or more employees in the
United Kingdom to have decreased strongly as well (see their
Table IV B).
7 The limited extent of downsizing in Germany might have
been caused by firms having been slow in adopting new
labour-saving technologies instead of being sluggish in
reorganizing industry structure. However, this is not confirmed
by investment data. Gross fixed capital formation as a per-
centage of value added in the German manufacturing sector
was 12% on average for the 1977–1990 period (computed
using data from OECD STAN Database, 1997). For the United
Kingdom and the United States this percentage was equal to
12% on average, as well. The average percentage for this
period for France was somewhat higher at 14%, and for Japan
it was much higher at 19%. In each of the last five years of
the period (1986–1990) the gross fixed capital formation
percentage for German manufacturing exceeded that for U.K.
and U.S. 
8 Klodt (1990) discusses how West German industrial policy
in the 1970s and 1980s has repressed structural change with
industries like mining, basic metals and shipbuilding receiving
subsidies to prevent declining employment. See also Stamer
(1998) for an econometric analysis relating subsidies, struc-
tural change and economic growth. Audretsch (2000) argues
that important barriers to innovative activity have prevented
Germany from generating a vibrant sector of new firms and
new industries. See also Lehrer (2000) discussing the history
of failure by the German economy to establish itself in new
industries. Restructuring in the German economy started on a
limited scale during the years 1994–1995 and has been
claimed to have contributed to the economic recovery in the
late 1990s (The Economist 343, 5 April 1997). 
9 There are also papers that do not use industry-level data but
study the impact of (developments of) the economy-wide share
of small firms at the regional level. Audretsch et al. (2000)
find evidence for a data set of 17 European countries for the
period 1990–1994 that those countries that have been slow in
shifting from “large” to “small” firms at the economy-wide
level to have suffered in terms of GNP growth. The analysis
leaves open the question, however, to what extent this is
caused by sectoral (inter-industry) employment shifts or by
intra-industry size class developments. Robbins et al. (2000)
perform a panel analysis of 48 U.S. states for the 1986–1995
period and find that states with higher proportions of (very)
small business employment (businesses with 20 employees
or less) experience higher levels of productivity growth and
Gross State Product growth.
10 For Japanese industries the period is 1975–1990 and for
U.S. industries the period is 1977–1987.
11 Only one industry shows an increase in the average share
over the 1977–1990 period: other chemicals (ISIC 352). The
pharmaceutical industry is an important part of this three-digit
industry.
12 See Fagerberg (2000) for a study into the consequences
of shifts in the economic structure on productivity growth.
He finds evidence of an increase in the share of the electrical
machinery industry (ISIC 383) in total manufacturing to have
a positive and significant effect on the growth of total manu-
facturing productivity in the same period.
13 Van Ark and Monnikhof (1996) report that especially for
France and Germany it is difficult to distinguish handicraft
from manufacturing. Therefore, we investigated the conse-
quences of using LFES in terms of the share of firms with 500
or more employees in the total employment of firms with 20
or more employees. If we consider this share, the average
LFES for France, Germany and the United Kingdom in 1977
were 0.533, 0.529 and 0.538, respectively. In 1990 these
figures were 0.463, 0.512 and 0.444. It was found that
measuring LFES in either of the two ways gives very similar
results to the ones reported in Section 3.
14 Some large multinational enterprises (like ABB) may be
best described as a federation of companies with a global
coordination center. The extent to which such companies are
independent “observations” is sometimes unclear.
15 Van Ark and Pilat (1993, p. 35) provide data comparing
the median and average sizes of manufacturing plants for
Germany, Japan and the United States (in 1987). They report
a median plant size in the manufacturing sector of 318
employees for Germany, 166 for Japan and 263 for the United
States. The average plant size is also the smallest in Japan at
16 employees. These average plant sizes are 30 for Germany
and 49 for the United States. 
16 The development of the extent of scale and scope
economies at the enterprise level and that at the establish-
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ment level may differ over time. Gollop and Monahan (1991),
for example, show for U.S. manufacturing over the 1963–1982
period, that enterprise diversification had been growing, while
establishment diversification had been declining. Loveman and
Sengenberger (1991), however, show in their Tables III and
IV that downsizing of enterprises and establishments has been
taking place in each of the five countries. Lane (1995, p. 73)
also provides empirical evidence for France and the United
Kingdom that the break-up of larger units into smaller ones
took place both at the enterprise and establishment level. This
strongly suggests that the industrial restructuring which started
in the late 1970s may be described by the decline of the share
of large units in terms of both “enterprises” and “establish-
ments”.
17 This is according to Table 6 of Martins et al. (1996).
18 Acs and Audretsch (1989) and Rosenbaum (1993) show
that industries which have a high small firm presence are less
attractive to new small entrants. A reason for this is that most
market niches will already have been filled. 
19 The effect of DLES is –0.440 (t-value of 2.7) when
combining the firm and establishment data of the five coun-
tries (to have 130 observations).
20 Germany has a value of VAI (in deviation of the mean)
of –0.08, –0.07, –0.09 and –0.07 for the four high-tech
industries and a corresponding value of DLES (again in
deviation of the mean) of 0.07, 0.07, 0.07 and 0.01.
21 Carree et al. (2000) show evidence for Germany to have
suffered in terms of economic growth as a consequence of
having a (structurally) low rate of self-employment (at the
economy-wide level). Reynolds et al. (1999) rank Germany as
a country with a low level of entrepreneurial activity and claim
that “Personal wealth creation or bankruptcy, though common
consequences of entrepreneurship, are both regarded nega-
tively among the German people.” (p. 37).
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